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This paper provides an institutional analysis of the South African Spatial Development Initiative 
(SDI) policy. It deals, firstly, with the concept of regional institutional structure, secondly, with the 
SDI program in South Africa and how it attempts to address national industrial strategy concerns in 
a spatially redistributive fashion, and thirdly, describes the case study of the growth-pole bulk-
export port of Richards Bay. 
The central argument of the paper is that the SDI policy has been constrained by the regional 
institutional dynamics operating in the places where the policy is to be implemented. This leads to a 
variety of unintended and unpredictable outcomes, as highlighted through the case study of 
Richards Bay. The paper addresses wider debates about national-local relations, insitutions, and 
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 “The Spatial Development Initiative [SDI] programme supports an interdepartmental investment 
facilitation strategy and is led by the national Department of Trade and Industry [DTI]. The prime 
objective of the SDIs is the creation of employment through innovative methods of investment 
facilitation. Regions with high growth potential for internationally competitive industries are targeted, 
usually linked to a port for easy trade access. After development potential, areas of historic under-





The South African Spatial Development Initiative (SDI) policy seeks to attract investors to specific 
regions of the country. In a country where the official unemployment rate is over 20%, and may be 
as high as 37% (RSA, 1998), the effectiveness of this ambitious programme is open to question in 
the current investment climate. However, it is too early to evaluate the program in terms of job 
creation and other outcomes using for example, the evaluation methodology of Isserman and 
Raphann (1995). In the absence of measurable outcomes, this paper will present an institutional 
analysis of the SDI policy. 
The central argument presented in this paper is that the SDI policy has been constrained by the 
regional institutional dynamics operating in the places where the policy is to be implemented. This 
leads to a variety of unintended and unpredictable outcomes, as highlighted through my case study 
of the growth pole bulk-export port of Richards Bay. The paper thus addresses wider debates 
about national-local relations, institutions, and the prospects for growth-pole regional development. 
In the first section of the paper I develop the concept of regional institutional structure as the 
formal and informal relationships between agents which come to constitute the environment within 
which people take decision and act. Economic behaviour, what we seek to influence through 
regional development policy, is embedded in regional institutional structure, and thus interventions 
need to pay attention to institutional issues. 
In the second section I introduce the SDI program and show how it attempts to address national 
industrial strategy concerns in a spatially redistributive fashion. Current South African industrial 
policy seeks to overcome the country’s historically inwardly focused industrial development, its 
dependence on raw or semi-processed minerals exports, and its highly concentrated ownership 
patterns. In the context of extreme spatial inequalities, the SDI policy adds a deliberately spatial 
component to national industrial policy. However, the pursuit of these goals is constrained by 
current restrictive macro-economic policies, and the partially federalist new South African 
constitution. This forces the national implementors of the policy to work with local agents. 
In the third section I present a case study of the growth-pole bulk-export port of Richards Bay. 
Here, the relationships between local government, the port authorities and a few large processing 
industries define regional institutional structure. In the Richards Bay case, the SDI strategy has 
been quickly and enthusiastically adopted by local organisations and interest groups. However, I 
argue that the existing regional institutional structure acts as a filtering mechanism that shapes the 
local implementation of the SDI policy. The result is that without careful attention to regional 
institutional structure, the SDI policy is most likely to reinforce the existing, and problematic, 
development trajectory. 





Regional Institutional Structure 
A useful starting point for understanding the implementation of national industrial policy is Peter 
Evans' suggestion that "variation in (development) involvement depends on variations in states 
themselves" (1995: 11). Evans' work on ‘embedded autonomy’ suggests the need for grounded 
research into the nature of policy development processes, and it focuses our attention on the way 
in which political, bureaucratic and economic interests are able to form coalitions around particular 
approaches to development policy. 
However, the problem with this approach is that it suggests that we can understand the impacts 
of development policy through analysis of a set of national government strategies alone. Doner 
(1992) is critical of developmental theories that place too much emphasis on the state, and ignore 
non-state forms of institutions. His case studies of the Asian auto industry show that collective 
action problems have been solved in a variety of ways, and thus he argues for a more diverse and 
inclusive institutionalist view of economic development. 
Similarly, to characterize the SDI’s as nothing more than a top-down investment promotion 
strategy does not explain why regional SDI Managers invest so much time in generating local 
support for the program. Rather, differences in regional implementation of the national program 
reflect regional differences in the outcome of negotiation and bargaining processes between 
national and local interests (Selznik, 1984). Such a view highlights the importance of research into 
the similarities and differences between the SDI’s, and exploring how the values and imperatives of 
the national program are communicated to, and mediated by, regional actors and institutions. 
Since, we are also interested in understanding what effects the policy might have, two questions 
remain: what do we mean when we speak of the (regional) institutions that mediate the national 
policy, and how do we understand their connection to regional development? In addressing these 
questions, I want to advance a tentative and synthetic definition of regional institutional structure. 
My starting point is to define institutions as the guiding norms or frameworks for human action 
that are the outcome of regular human interactions and relationships, and that may or may not be 
formalised in organisational, legal, contractual or some other conscious form. In more general 
terms, this definition reflects the concept of “duality of structure, which relates to the fundamentally 
recursive character of social life, and expresses the mutual dependence of structure and agency” 
(Giddens, 1979: 69). Economic behaviour, what we seek to influence in regional development 
practice, is embedded in networks of inter-personal relations (Granovetter, 1985). These networks 
are simultaneously enabling and constraining. Using Granovetter’s terminology, the approach 
developed here is critical of both under-socialised views of human action (specifically neo-classical 
economics which presents an image of independent rational actors), and over-socialised views of 
human action (such as social theory that emphasises only legal and formal organisational 
structures).  
This view of institutions has two policy implications which relate to Giddens’ insight that time and 
space are critical components of social analysis (Cassell, 1993). Firstly, institutions have territorial 
dimensions. By concentrating upon human relationships, ideal-typically repeated face to face 
contacts, in the formation of institutions, we are alerted to the importance of proximity (Storper, 
1996). This idea has been used to argue that regions have a special place in learning and 
innovation. Amin (1998: 7) notes that “in a world in which codified knowledge is becoming 
increasingly ubiquitously available, uncodified knowledge, rooted in relations of proximity, attains a 




higher premium in delivering competitive advantage owing to their inimitability.” But proximity only 
confers a premium insofar as this uncodified knowledge has some value. In arguing that 
institutions, as the basis for human action, are importantly localised, this is not to say that they 
necessarily lead to desirable developmental outcomes. The spatiality of institutions does not free 
us from establishing causal relationships between regional institutions and particular patterns of 
development. 
Secondly, it is important to note that institutions, as networks of human relationships, are to 
some extent historically path-dependent, in the sense that they develop through repetition, and 
they are shaped by identifiable pre-existing relationships. However, while I explicitly reject the idea 
that institutions are only formally and consciously created, or that they are exogenously given, it is 
equally true that formal organisations, legal and administrative frameworks can and do play a key 
role in defining the nature of the relationships between humans. In other words, formal institutions 
such as particular contractual relationships and industrial structures, professional associations and 
communication mechanisms do shape informal institutions and human relationships. Furthermore, 
political agents, operating from national to local levels, do act to shape these formal organisations, 
legal and administrative frameworks (Polanyi, 1944). The point is that social institutions are deeply 
interpenetrated with, and not independent of, politics and policy. 
Our working understanding of regional institutional structure thus includes both the formal 
(contractual, organisational, technical) and informal (norms, networks) relationships between 
agents which emerge from different production activities, patterns of ownership, administrative 
systems and decision-making forums. Regional institutional structure is important because it 
constitutes the environment within which people take decisions and engage in action with real 
development consequences. It thus has the power to shape, or at least filter, policy interventions, 
but is at the same time an arena for policy intervention. As a conceptual tool, it provides a 
framework for understanding the actual implementation and potential effects of the SDIs. 
 
Spatial Development Initiatives in Theory and Practice 
In this section I discuss the SDIs as a component of national industrial policy with an explicitly 
spatial orientation. I show however that the policy is constrained by a lack of resources in the 
current macro-economic policy context, and by the constitutional framework which requires 
national-local co-operation on key development issues. The section starts by highlighting the key 
features of the SDI policy. 
The SDIs seek to attract private investment to various parts of the country, or in the words of 
Paul Jourdan, co-ordinator of the SDIs within the Department of Trade and Industry, they "are a 
proven means of giving government more job-creating bang for its very limited bucks" (WMG, Nov. 
7, 1997). He goes on to explain that the SDIs "are a package of measures that aim to attract 
investors into a bundle of economically sustainable projects in a region with the potential for 
growth". However, due to fiscal constraints, "governments' financial investment in an initiative is 
limited to less than 10% of the total amount". Thus "areas where initiatives are set up identify 
themselves. They must have a proven economic base because the program simply aims to loosen 
constraints and allow them to grow to their maximum potential". The idea of inherent potential is an 
important part of making the policy politically acceptable within the macro-economic policy and 
constitutional constraints; it serves to justify both the limited number of places selected as SDIs 
(see Hirschman, 1958), and the limited public resources applied in each case. 




Most SDI’s have been oriented towards connecting the inland mineral-industrial heartland of the 
country (i.e. greater Johannesburg) to Mozambique and other neighboring countries (see DBSA, 
1997), and towards export-oriented production in the port-industrial cities of Durban, Richards Bay, 
Cape Town-Saldahna (see Fitschen, 1998), and Port Elizabeth-East London (see Driver, 1998). In 
these SDI projects, transportation, infrastructure and industrial development concerns 
predominate, and thus the Departments of Transport and of Trade and Industry have played the 
leading role. In the more rural Wild Coast and Lubombo areas, the SDI’s have been targeted 
towards rural development through agriculture, tourism and transportation oriented investments. 
The preparation and marketing of investment projects is the key activity of the SDI’s that is 
supported by public funds. In the infrastructure field, investment opportunities include various 
public-private arrangements for toll roads, port upgrading, telecommunications, and urban / 
industrial services. In the industrial SDI’s, there is heavy emphasis on identifying projects that 
involve manufacturing of semi-processed raw materials for export, in keeping with some of the key 
tenets of national industrial policy. In the tourism SDI’s, there is an emphasis on hotels, game parks 
and other tourist attractions that appeal to the international tourist market. 
Some SDI areas may include ‘Industrial Development Zones’ (IDZs), the only component of the 
SDI program that is likely to gain legislative status. A draft policy document states that “the aim of 
IDZ development is to establish an environment conducive to predominantly export production and 
attractive to both international as well as local investors” (DTI, 1998: 4). The government has been 
anxious to avoid the ‘Export Processing Zone’ image, and the draft policy includes proposals for 
human resources development and labor dispute resolution, and an Integrated Environmental 
Management Strategy. 
The SDI program, which is co-ordinated from an SDI Office within the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI), relies extensively upon horizontal and vertical mechanisms of co-operative 
governance to achieve its goals. An Overall SDI Co-ordinating Committee (OSDICC), chaired by 
the DTI, provides a forum aimed at ensuring intra-governmental co-operation. OSDICC includes 
representatives from most national government departments, the parastatal finance and 
investment agencies, the national transport enterprises, parastatal Research Councils, and the 
managers of the individual SDI projects. Of these agencies, the parastatal finance agencies have 
been the most active participants, seconding staff to act as Interim SDI Managers (e.g., the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa), and in identifying ‘bankable’ investment projects (e.g., the 
Industrial Development Corporation), while others have re-oriented some of their activities to 
support the program (e.g., with research in the case of the Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research). 
The SDI Office, in consultation with regional organizations, appoints Managers to implement the 
various SDI’s. There is some variation in the implementation of the various SDI’s, but officials in the 
SDI Office of the DTI do now speak of a generalized “SDI Methodology”.1 A key task of an SDI 
Manager is to identify local ‘champions’ and stakeholders to provide the program with legitimacy, 
and to ensure that they leave behind an organization after the ‘exit phase’ to continue the 
                                                           
1 An internal DTI document titled “Planning Procedures for SDIs” identifies the following implementation phases, which may run 
concurrently: 
Gathering information on a potential SDI area. 
Pre-feasibility appraisal of data and development of a strategic conceptual framework. 
Establishment of institutional structures at political, official and technical levels. 
Identification and appraisal of lead projects and development of program of action. 
Finalisation of detailed detailed project perspective document, called ‘project packaging’. 
Launch of the SDI, usually in an Investors Conference and establishment of investment promotion mechanism. 
Exit phase, which involves the establishment of regional cluster process for selected sectors in the SDI area. 




investment promotion work. Individual SDI Managers thus rely heavily upon the use of political 
capital and informal co-operative mechanisms to do their work. 
The SDIs combine notions of corridor or polarised and infrastructure-led development (see 
Gore, 1984) with an implicit assumption of considerable informational market failure in the 
investment arena. Thus the policy is predicated on the belief that concentrated investment 
promotion activities, supported by key infrastructure investments, can deliver much-needed jobs. 
However, the SDIs do not appear to be informed by a strong theoretical basis, and SDI Managers 
admit that they are learning by doing. If the SDIs do not derive directly from regional development 
theory, what is the origin of the SDIs as a formal national policy? At a national level, the SDIs 
reflect the pursuit of two goals, industrial policy and spatial redistribution (Lewis and Bloch, 1997), 
constrained by macro-economic policy and the constitution. 
Firstly, the SDIs have clearly been motivated by the industrial policy objectives of the national 
government, implemented by the DTI. Platzky (1998) summarises these as export orientation and 
earning foreign exchange, sustainable job creation, better utilisation of existing infrastructure and 
resources and broadening the ownership base of the economy. The attraction of foreign direct 
investment, and the re-orientation of production and key infrastructure towards the export market 
are key components of this industrial strategy. 
Secondly, the spatiality of the SDI policy reflects a recognition of the profoundly unequal 
historical pattern of spatial development in South Africa. In his classic study of Apartheid-era 
industrial decentralisation policies, Trevor Bell (1973), argued that "there is a sense in which the 
South African economy may be said to be 'dualistic' ... there are of course striking inequalities in 
South Africa between the living standards of whites and Africans within all regions. But this should 
not be allowed to obscure the fact that in respect of their material wealth, the inhabitants of the 
Bantu areas are much worse off than the urban Africans" (p11)2. The spatial dimensions of the 
inequality in South African society remained, unsurprisingly, extremely resiliant to the attentions of 
Apartheid economic planners who sought to prevent black urbanisation3. 
In part, the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) can be understood as an attempt 
to come to terms with this reality. It was from within the RDP Office (based in the office of Deputy 
President Thabo Mbeki) and later from within the Department of Constitutional Development and 
Provincial Affairs, that the idea of a National Spatial Development Framework (NSDF) emerged. 
The NSDF “was an attempt to illustrate to provinces and line departments the spatial implications 
of their plans and programmes in an attempt to rationalise their spending” (Platzky, 1998). 
Currently, the NSDF has not gained legislative status and its future is uncertain; it is also 
unclear whether it succeeded in increasing inter- and intra-governmental planning coherence. 
However, it is clear that the NSDF contributed importantly to the spatiality of the SDI idea. The 
NSDF, and indeed much current South African spatial development planning thinking, draws 
heavily on notions of corridor development (Harrison and Todes, 1996)4. 
The SDIs thus reflect the pursuit of industrial policy and spatial development goals. However, 
the pursuit of these goals is constrained by two factors. Firstly, the Growth, Employment and 
                                                           
2 This reality was confirmed in the 1984 Second Carnegie Enquiry into Poverty in South Africa, again in the 1994 World Bank-
sponsored Survey of Living Standards and Development, and in every Central Statistical Services / Statistics South Africa annual 
October Household Survey since 1995. 
3 For a review of regional development policy under apartheid see Pretorious, Addleson and Tomlinson, 1993a and 1993b. 
4 The corridor idea has been enthusiastically applied by South African planners to local (eg pedestrian-oriented high-density urban 
development as a way of compacting urban development), metropolitan (eg transit-oriented development to integrate townships 
into the urban fabric), regional (eg extending development into rural areas along transport arteries between major urban centers) 
and international (eg establishing or re-establishing linkages with Southern African neighbours) level analyses. It also features 
prominently in the Department of Transport’s recent Moving South Africa (DOT, 1998) study. 




Redistribution (GEAR) macro-economic policy. In seeking to improve foreign investor confidence, 
the GEAR policy is fiscally restrictive, and seeks to reduce the deficit before borrowing to 3% of 
GDP from its present 6% (RSA, 1996a). The implementation of the GEAR macro-economic policy 
limits the public resources that may be applied to the SDIs, and thus in part explains the aggressive 
private investment orientation of the policy. 
Secondly, the framing of the SDI policy cannot be understood without reference to the new, 
partially federalist South African constitution. The new constitution of South Africa establishes 
provincial governments and local authorities as equal tiers of government (RSA, 1996b). How 
these constitutional directives are interpreted in practice is of course something that is still being 
determined. One clue to understanding how this issue will be played out can be found in analysis 
of the defined areas of functional competence at the local level. The constitution includes a list of 
functional areas of concurrent national and provincial / local legislative competence (Schedule 4) 
and of exclusive provincial legislative competence (Schedule 5) (RSA, 1996b). Part A of each 
schedule lays out the areas of concurrent and exclusive Provincial competence5, and Part B the 
areas of concurrent and exclusive local government competence6. For the purposes of this paper, 
it is important to highlight that harbours are an area of concurrent local-national competence. 
In granting these powers, the constitution has created possibilities for aggressive territorial 
competition at various spatial scales, something that particularly the NSDF policy-makers (see 
Platzky, 1998) sought to avoid. Given that certain key regional development decisions have been 
moved into the inter-governmental arena, the constitution forces national policy-makers to enter 
into relationships with local agents. It is this fact which then opens up the possibility of important 
regional variations in the implementation of national policy, and forces us to look within regions to 
understand how the SDIs might be implemented in practice. 
 
Richards Bay 
This section presents empirical material for the case study of Richards Bay. I first describe the town 
in conventional analytical terms, highlighting the prominence of the port and a few large processing 
industries. I then reconstruct the conventional analysis of the local economy in institutional terms 
highlighting the tight regional institutional structure that reflects and reinforces the development 
trajectory of the town. Finally I show how the agenda of the local SDI program has been shaped 
within this institutional context, and thus argue that the SDI policy is currently unable to 
fundamentally shift the development trajectory of Richards Bay. 
Richards Bay occupies a special place in the minds of many South African regionalists and is 
regarded as one of few successful growth poles. Many residents of Richards Bay incorporate this 
idea of success into their identities. Some see themselves as having tamed a wild frontier, and will 
remind visitors of how they built the town from ‘nothing’. A promotional brochure tells us that “until 
the 1960’s, Richards Bay was a small fishing village nestling on high ground overlooking the 
natural Mhlathuze estuary and wetlands” (RBTA, nd). In 1997 the population of Richards Bay and 
                                                           
5 Exclusive areas of provincial legislative competence are limited mostly to cultural matters (eg provincial sport, museums, libraries, 
archives), but do include provincial planning (without specifying what this means). Concurrent areas of national and provincial 
legislative competence include a huge range of issues relevant to regional development, including: casinos, racing, gambling and 
wagering, excluding lotteries and sports pools; education at all levels, excluding tertiary education; environment; health services; 
housing; industrial promotion; public transport; some public works; regional planning and development; tourism; and trade. 
6 Exclusive areas of local government competence include important areas for local economic intervention, such as street trading, 
markets, beaches and public recreation infrastructure, and a range of urban amenity services. Concurrent areas of local government 
competence include municipal planning, tourism, some public works, harbours (excluding international shipping matters) and 
trading regulations. The new constitution thus creates considerable space and a responsibility for, local economic development 
strategy-making and implementation. 




the some 20-km distant dormitory township of Esikhaweni was an estimated 98 000 (RB, 1998), 
and Richards Bay accounted for around 1% of South Africa’s GDP in 1993. 
The Port of Richards Bay was developed in the early 1970s by Portnet, the national transport 
agency in terms of an act of parliament (Act 28 of 1972) (see Fair and Jones, 1991). When it was 
officially opened in 1976, the harbour included four clean- or general-cargo berths (the combi 
terminal) and two private bulk-coal berths. It had been dredged to accommodate ships in the 150 
000 dwt range, and was connected to the interior coalfields by a largely purpose-built rail link of 
525km. Since then, various infrastructural additions have been made, including expansion of the 
privately-owned Richards Bay Coal Terminal which now has 4 berths, and the addition of a private 
chemical terminal, 4 dry-bulk terminals which handle a range of minerals, fertilizer and woodchips, 
and a bulk-metal terminal. 
As a port, this is a highly successful development. The Port of Richards Bay handles in the 
region of 81mt of cargo per annum, more than all other South African ports combined. These 
figures are dominated by the approximately 60mt of coal which are exported annually; but the 
value of cargo moved is relatively low. It is important to note that much of the infrastructural 
investment in the Richards Bay harbour is dedicated to particular product types. Conversely, the 
general cargo capacity of the port is limited. For example, even though the port is able to move 
containers in the general-cargo terminal, the port has no dedicated container-handling facilities. In 
1997, the port handled only 13 471 TEUs7 (POR, 1997) which represents less than 1% of the 
national quantity. Thus most Richards Bay companies make use of the Durban Port when moving 
containers. 
Another reason why local companies do not use the port to ship containers has to do with the 
Richards Bay's insertion into global shipping networks; the fact that this is a bulk-export harbour 
implies a particular relationship between the port and the international shipping industry. In general, 
bulk carrier vessels do not follow fixed routes, and are chartered by shipping agents to handle 
specific cargoes. Thus, unlike container and general-cargo ports, the Port of Richards Bay is 
generally not on the regular route of any shipping line. Since one firm is unlikely to fill a container or 
general cargo vessel alone, local companies make use of the Durban hub which offers a wide 
variety of destinations at comparatively low cost8. 
As is typical of much 1970s growth pole development, government-owned and large industrial 
conglomerates played a key role initially (Aniruth and Barnes, 1998). Today the economy of 
Richards Bay continues to be dominated by a handful of large raw material processing industries, 
and a rather undeveloped network of supporting service industries. Gross geographic product 
provides an initial way of understanding the structure of the local economy9. Manufacturing 
accounts for 57% of the R3bn of local output, while the Transport sector accounts for 18% (in the 
national economy, manufacturing accounts for 24% and transport for 8% of GDP). The dominance 
of these sectors is even more remarkable considering that the statistical region includes significant 
                                                           
7 Containers generally come in two sizes, twenty- and forty-foot. The standard measure of the number handled is the Twenty-Foot 
Equivalent Unit or TEU. 
8 This pattern may be shifting slightly due to the increase in trade within the Southern African region. This trade has opened 
increasing possibilities for regular coastal routes between Durban (and perhaps even Cape Town) and Mombassa by smaller geared 
(ie with their own ability to move containers and other cargo) vessels. However, while this implies greater access to regular 
shipping routes, it does not necessarily imply direct insertion into global trade networks. This will only occur if the Port of Richards 
Bay is able to capture a significant proportion of all Southern African container traffic, which seems unlikely given Durban's 
dominance, and the stated unwillingness of inter-continental shipping lines to stop at more than one port on South Africa's east 
coast. 
9 The most recently available figures are for 1993. These are available for the Lower Umfolozi magisterial district which includes the 
agricultural service center town of Empangeni and surrounding sugar cane / forest plantations in addition to Richards Bay. The data 
are only available at 1-digit SIC code level due to confidentiality considerations in this small economy. 
 




agricultural lands (resulting in a location quotient for agriculture of 1.3). These statistics point to the 
highly undeveloped local tertiary sector, although this has changed to a small degree with some 
successful shopping center development in the past 5 years. 
Although Richards Bay has grown very rapidly, there are considerable structural problems in the 
local economy. The local economy is dominated by a few low value-adding large firms which offer 
limited employment opportunities and limited backward and forward linkages (Lewis and Bloch, 
1997), while the small firm sector is undeveloped. The local economy is subject to boom-bust 
cycles that are associated with the construction of mega-projects; for example, respondents report 
that the local housing market collapsed following completion of the Billiton Hillside aluminium 
smelter in 1995. A document prepared for the Launch Workshop of the Richards Bay SDI (RBSDI, 
1997) identifies a series of lacking infrastructure attributes that might make the area more attractive 
to inward investment. These include a dedicated container-handling facility at the port, cheaper 
land and utilities, a water supply unaffected by drought, improved road connections, a toxic waste 
dump-site and improved policing. 
Various commentators have pointed to the institutional basis of these development 
shortcomings. Aniruth and Barnes (1998) argue that “there appears to have been very little 
exceptional co-ordination between the various institutions in the historical development of Richards 
Bay, except in the initial phase”. They go on to argue that while individual organisations had been 
efficient in the execution of its own duties, co-ordination was lacking; “it is therefore quite probable 
that greater co-ordination between the various institutions would have accelerated development 
within the locality”. The problem with this argument is that it tends to view institutions in formal 
organisational terms only. In fact we find in Richards Bay a very tight institutional structure 
concentrated in the relationships between the port and other actors and agencies. 
For Lewis and Bloch (1997: 16), Richards Bay’s institutional problems revolve around the 
observation that “an entrepreneurial local bureaucracy, and a private sector engaged in the 
development of the region have not materialised to any significant degree”. The result is that 
Richards Bay has not “endogenised a capacity to attract industrial investment”. Thus, the policy 
challenge (for the SDIs) is that “if specific effort is not made, and institutions not designed to 
develop local civic and technical capacity in the early phases, important learning opportunities will 
be sacrificed and patterns of interaction will be established which will skew the industrial 
development of the region” (p18). While certainly agreeing that a capacity to innovate has not been 
endogenised in Richards Bay, I argue below that the challenge is not simply to create a new 
institutional structure, but rather to reconfigure the existing relationships between various actors. 
There are two aspects to the existing nexus of relationships. 
 





The relationship between the port and the large industries that dominate the economy is strong. 
Most large local industries are intimately connected to the port; this applies to the two aluminium 
smelters10, the fertiliser plant11, and to the mineral extraction12 and wood processing13 industries. 
There are a few firms that depart from the pattern described above. The only ‘high-value added’ 
jewel in the Richards Bay crown, Bell Equipment14 uses the Durban port, while the few other local 
firms of note mostly produce for the domestic market15.  
Similarly, the undeveloped small firm sector has a limited relationship with the port, although 
there may be some potential for change here. In the course of interviews, it emerged that some of 
the large corporates, notably Billiton by way of its Hillside Smelter, had implemented a downsizing 
program supported by more modern supply-management techniques. Although this cannot yet be 
verified quantitatively, it appears that this has stimulated a series of local supply firms to provide 
services and hold inventory that was previously held in-house. This has increased competitive 
pressures on local small firms, while creating opportunities for growth. For example, one firm that 
supplies wooden palettes for exporting aluminium ingots has recently applied its existing plant and 
machinery to construct furniture for the European market. Similarly, a local industrial cleaning 
chemicals packaging firm has started repackaging waste chemicals, a by-product of the Mondi 
Paper Mill, for export to east Africa. However, since both these firms export in containers, they 
currently make little use of the local port. 
The relationships between the large industries and the port dominate both quantitatively (i.e. 
they are important to many firms), and also qualitatively; they are not merely contractual, and are 
reinforced at many levels. The result is that the ‘institutional distance’ between the port authorities 
and the large industries is short. Firstly, in many cases, the relationship involves considerable 
investment in infrastructure. This is true both for the port (eg, the specialised commodity terminals) 
                                                           
10 The Billiton (formerly Alusaf) Bayside and Hillside Aluminium Smelters. The Bayside smelter was developed in 1971 as one of the 
original anchor projects. The Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), the national electricity producer (Eskom) and mining 
conglomerate Genmin (now called Billiton) were the initial stakeholders in the project.  The Hillside smelter which was built in the 
early 1990s also relied on IDC loan and export credit finance (Aniruth and Barnes, 1998). Both these smelters import bauxite to 
produce aluminium ingots, for the domestic and export markets. In the case of the older Bayside smelter, the bauxite is transported 
on a dedicated rail link (on which Alusaf used to operate its own rolling stock), while in the case of the newer Hillside smelter, 
bauxite is transported by conveyer belt. 
11 Indian Ocean Fertilizers, a fertilizer and phosphoric acid plant; the national parastatal Foskor (or Phosphates Corporation) played 
an important role in the formation of this plant in the 1970s. The plant makes use of the privately-operated Richards Bay Bunker 
Terminal and Bulk Storage for liquid chemicals, and the Portnet-operated dry-bulk and combi terminals to ship rock phosphates and 
fertilizers.  
12 Richards Bay Minerals which mines sand dunes around Richards Bay to produce a range of metals including rutile, zircon, 
monazite, titanium and magnetite. These minerals are used in the local market or are exported through the Richards Bay bulk metal 
and dry-bulk terminals. 
13 The Mondi Paper Company, an Anglo-American subsidiary produces paper and some 300,000 tons of pulp per annum. Much of 
the pulp is exported with pulp produced elsewhere in the province through Durban harbour, but paper products are exported 
through the Richards Bay combi terminal.  The Central Timber Co-operative chipping mill was established in 1981. It is the sixth 
largest such plant in the world. In 1993 this was joined by the SilvaCell plant that produces woochips for export to the Far East. 
Both of these plants make use of the Richards Bay dry-bulk terminal. 
14 Bell Equipment produces heavy articulated equipment for sugar cane, mining, forestry and construction industries. The firm 
relocated to Richards Bay from Empangeni in 1984 to gain industrial incentives on offer at the time. Even though over 90% of its 
inputs (by value) are imported, and over 40% of its revenue comes from exports, virtually all shipments are handled through the 
Durban port because of the container facilities and shipping routes available there. Bell has exclusive use of 2 articulated trucks for 
hauling goods between Durban and Richards Bay. Although the firm is an important local employer, it has almost no local suppliers. 
The firm has not performed well in recently years, and it is has recently closed both its international plants (in Mauritius and New 
Zealand). 
15 These include Suncrush, a company which produces and bottles carbonated cooldrinks for the domestic market, and which was 
attracted to Richards Bay by incentives in 1981 and Syncat, a producer of zeolite catalysts for domestic and export markets. Syncat 
is 60% owned by the government Central Energy Fund (Aniruth and Barnes, 1998). 




and the firms (eg, conveyer belts). This implies co-operation in technical operations, as well as long 
term contractual relationships. Secondly, although over 20 transportation intermediaries (eg, 
clearing and forwarding, ships agents) operate in Richards Bay, due to the specialised nature of 
the cargoes handled, generally only one such agency mediates the relationship between the port 
and individual large industries. For example, the Billiton smelters have a long-term relationship with 
the Strange-Rennies shipping agency that handles all the aluminium exports. 
There are also various fora within which the relationship between the port and the large 
industries is entrenched. Firstly, the local Port Manager is a member of the Zululand Chamber of 
Commerce, and the Richards Bay large industry ‘branch’ of the Chamber provides a forum for 
deepening the relationship between the port and particular business concerns16. Secondly, the port 
management facilitates a series of regular meetings with key clients, including an annual client 
conference. There is also a history of joint port-industry working groups addressing specific 
sectoral issues; for example, the Ferro-alloy Producers Association currently meets with the port in 
a regular working group. This level of local involvement by Portnet management is unusual. 
Thirdly, there are regular but unscheduled forums for the building of relationships at non-executive 
level. Since the vessels that visit Richards Bay are generally chartered for specific cargoes, each 
ship visit becomes an occasion for at least one meeting between middle-management and 
technical staff of the producer, port and shipping agents. 
The relationship between the port and key sectors of local industry is facilitated by the scale of 
the port operation, the nature of the goods handled, the attitudes and behaviour of key individuals 
within the port management, particular contractual and technical relationships, and other agencies 
which have come to reflect and entrench the relationship. Altogether this relationship constitutes a 
defining dimension of regional institutional structure. 
 
The Role of Local Government 
There is also an important political basis for the tight institutional structure being described here. I 
have already referred to the ‘frontier mentality’ found amongst many of the residents who first 
settled in the Richards Bay growth pole. This construction is often personified in Theo Tolme, the 
highly entrepreneurial Town Clerk of Richards Bay Local Council until the mid-1990s. Unlike many 
local governments in South Africa, local government in Richards Bay has played an explicit and 
important role in shaping the development trajectory of the town, and it seems likely that this 
institutionalised role will continue. Development in Richards Bay is guided within a very ambitious 
and clearly defined Structure Plan framework that is compatible with long term port expansion 
plans, and a forecasted residential population of over 1 million people in 30 years (RBTLC, 1997). 
Aniruth and Barnes (1998) suggest that in the past, local government has not played an active 
role in pursuing development, pointing to the fact that the incentives which attracted key industries 
to Richards Bay were administered by national government. Similarly, some local respondents 
have commented that the local authority discouraged certain industries from locating within the 
town. However, this view is incomplete since it misses some of the key areas in which local 
                                                           
16 The Zululand Chamber of Business is organised into four geographical branches (the northern and southern districts, and the 
towns of Empangeni and Richards Bay). The Richards Bay branch is divided into small (ie commercial and service firms) and large 
industries branches. The Chamber was formed under the auspices of the South African Chamber of Business when the South 
African Chamber of Industries and Association of South African Chambers of Commerce merged. These organisations historically 
represented white, English-speaking industrial and commercial interests respectively. It is thus not unusual for the amalgamation 
between manufacturing and commerce to be partial as is the case in Richards Bay. 
 




government has, and continues, to positively shape certain forms of local development, while 
discouraging others. 
Firstly, the local council has unusually large land-holdings (by South African standards) and has 
used these in an entrepreneurial way. All the land within the town of Richards Bay was granted to 
the municipality in the 1970s (Aniruth and Barnes, 1998). The council has operated as developer of 
the Alton industrial estate, and actively markets a ‘portfolio’ of industrial land that includes some 
large sites adjacent to the harbour and Richards Bay-Empangeni highway (known as the John 
Ross highway). By including a clause in the sale of industrial land, the council ensures that 
industrialists are compelled to purchase water and electricity from the council, thus ensuring an 
important income stream. While there has been some debate about the pricing of these utilities, it 
is unclear whether this has deterred investors. Furthermore, when potential investors approach the 
local council, they are apparently asked to fill in one questionnaire that is then processed within the 
bureaucracy according to an established system. The fact that such an investor reception 
procedure exists reflects an unusually pro-development orientation by South African standards. 
Secondly, local government co-operates closely with the port authorities in a set of relationships 
that have a long history. Currently, every two months there is a port liaison meeting. The meeting 
includes the Port Manager and Town Clerk, the Port and City Engineers, the Port and City 
Property/Estates Managers and the Port and City Electricians. The connection between the port 
and the city is largely at the professional and technical level, and has a long history; the current 
meeting grew out of the old South African Railways Council meeting which apparently started with 
the first port construction in the 1970s. The results of this relationship are institutional in the sense 
that they contribute to the ongoing prominence of the port in the way development is 
conceptualised in Richards Bay. 
The results of this political aspect of institutional structure can be seen in the compatibility of 
long-term port and council planning frameworks. For example, the council has not sub-divided the 
largest properties adjacent to the port, arguing that these may be needed for large processing 
industries. For example, apparently the SilvaCell wood chipping plant struggled to secure its 
location near the port because it wanted a relatively small site. However, it is incorrect to interpret 
the resistance of the council to smaller industrialists as reflecting an anti-growth bias; this rather 
reflects the priviledging of industries that enhance the utilisation of existing and planned port 
infrastructure investments. 
Local government in Richards Bay has not been left unaffected by the political changes in South 
Africa. However, there are reasons for arguing that the new balance of political forces is unlikely to 
rapidly or dramatically change the relationships described above. Local government re-
organisation in Richards Bay was defined by two decisions. Firstly, the historically white town of 
Richards Bay was amalgamated with the black dormitory township of Esikhaweni in order to 
ensure joint administration of the two functionally linked, but spatially dislocated, places. Secondly, 
due to various political factors, the town of Richards Bay did not amalgamate with the nearby white 
town of Empangeni, nor were the city boundaries extended to incorporate adjacent Inkatha 
Freedom Party controlled tribal areas. 
The result is that the largest party (without an absolute majority) in the current Richards Bay 
Transitional Local Council, the African National Congress, here represents an essentially urban 
working class constituency. Based on a limited number of key informant interviews, it seems 
reasonable to argue that this council, while concerned with living conditions in the black residential 
areas, is unwilling to fundamentally challenge the developmental agenda of the ‘old’ council. In 
other words, jobs in large industries, rather than other development agendas, continue to have 
political appeal. 




Figure 1 summarises the institutional structure described above. The institutional analysis adds 
new insights as to why Richards Bay has developed in a particular way, and connects to other 
analyses of the limitations of growth pole development elsewhere in the world (see Gore, 1984). It 
seeks to uncover the underlying institutional structure that conditions the decisions that are taken in 
public and private spheres. What the institutional analysis highlights is that the ability of local actors 
to capture resources of national government and parastatal agencies, to seek and attract investors, 
to efficiently and rapidly develop land, and provide certain well run infrastructure is not the problem. 
Rather, the Richards Bay port authorities, city council and large industries do these things so well 
that they preclude development forms that require other ‘inputs’, or a different institutional 
environment. 
 
The Richards Bay Spatial Development Initiative 
Richards Bay, as a growth pole, has grown on the basis of inward investment of large 
manufacturing concerns and infrastructural investment. Given this history and the regional 
institutional structure I have described, it should be no surprise the SDI program has been 
enthusiastically received in Richards Bay. Even Richards Bay’s vocal environmental lobby appears 
to be satisfied with the program, while perceptions of exclusion in the neighbouring town of 
Empangeni have apparently been pacified. The SDI Manager, on secondment from the DBSA, has 
support from key local actors. 
However, it is also clear that key dimensions of the program have been absorbed into the 
existing institutional structure. An SDI Trust has been formed to implement the program, and the 
port and local council have jointly chaired the trust to date.  Other key local economic actors are 
represented in this Trust. The formal organisations represented include Portnet, the Mhlatuze 
Water Board, Business Against Crime and the Community Policing Forum, the Utungulu District 
Council, Richards Bay and Empangeni local councils, the provincial Department of Economic 
Affairs, the national Department of Trade and Industry, the local branch of the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions, and the Inyanda and Zululand Business Chambers (representing black and 
white business-people respectively). 
The approach of the SDI Trust and Manager has been to resist political pressures for a high-
profile investors conference. Rather, the Trust has identified a series of infrastructural projects that 
are perceived to be required to improve the investment climate. These include, improving the John 
Ross highway that links Richards Bay and Empangeni, increasing the bulk water supply and 
securing supply during drought periods, reducing crime through improved policing, improved refuse 
removal facilities and a toxic waste site, and development of a dedicated container-handling facility 
at the port. 
At the time of writing, the SDI Trust and Manager had succeeded in convincing the South 
African Police Service to build a new police station in the Richards Bay, and was negotiating 
financial packages for the water and highway developments. However, it seems likely that lobbying 
by Durban-based shipping firms has stopped the container terminal proposal in the Portnet head 
offices. 
The SDI Trust is now marketing a series of investment projects, most of which attempt to 
process raw materials produced in the large local extraction industries17. Investors are also being 
                                                           
17 The list of projects on the SDI Web Site (RB, 1998) for which investors are being sought includes: 
- From aluminium, a components foundry, and production of cast wheels, extrusion billets and components for residential 
buildings. 
- From sugar by-products, citric acid and bagasse particle boards-based factories. 




sought for a dry-dock and ship repair complex which has been planned for several years. The SDI 
has also been working to attract tourism investments through the development of a passenger 
terminal at the port and the development of waterfront facilities near the mouth of the port. These 
developments would be linked to tourism investment possibilities being marketed under the 
auspices of the Lubombo SDI. There are proposals for the establishment of a Richards Bay 
Investment Centre that would be responsible for information dissemination, a one-stop investor 
service, and regional marketing, and for an Industrial Development Zone adjacent to the port. 
The Richards Bay SDI is regarded as one of the more successful SDIs. A local organisation has 
been created with demonstrated local legitimacy, and implementation has thus far emphasised real 
infrastructural improvements rather than moving prematurely to investment promotion. However, it 
is most likely that these infrastructure improvements will only succeed in attracting more of the 
same kind of investors that currently populate Richards Bay. The problem is that the SDI program 
reflects, rather than challenges, the institutional structure of the region and thus the decision 
frameworks of agents. Put simply, the SDI program currently does not contribute to substantial 
economic diversification, the creation of an entrepreneurial and innovative climate, a shift in the 
operating environment for small business, the development of a new skills base, or the 
strengthening of rural-urban economic linkages.  
 
Conclusions 
If regional development for Richards Bay is defined as the establishment of large processing 
industries, then many of the criticisms of the SDI contained in this paper would no longer apply. 
Clearly in terms of stated industrial policy goals, and in terms of current regional development 
thinking, this old pattern is not good enough. Certainly, it is too early to evaluate the success of the 
overall SDI policy or of individual initiatives in terms of outcomes. However, the central argument of 
this paper is that national industrial strategy is importantly constrained by the regional institutional 
dynamics operating in the places where the policy has been implemented. Thus, in order to 
understand the impacts that the SDIs are likely to have on the pattern of regional development, I 
have looked at the way in which the national program is shaped by regional institutional structure. 
Richards Bays’ particular regional institutional structure reflects its history as a growth pole; it 
has successfully advantaged some forms of development while actively excluding others. Here 
then is the developmental dilemma; the existing regional institutional structure is both the cause, 
and the means to a solution, of the problem. This paper argues that an SDI policy, and indeed any 
national industrial policy, that only concerns itself with the preparation of investment project 
proposals will serve to entrench the already institutionalised notion that Richards Bay can only 
grow through external investments of the kind that have been made previously. Thus Richards Bay 
will continue to have no endogenous growth dynamic, and will continue to have a distorted 
development trajectory. This should not be taken as saying that only ‘soft’ or social interventions 
are important for regional development. Inward investment and infrastructural improvements are 
certainly important for sustainable growth; the question is how these reflect, and also may 
potentially shift, regional institutional structures. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
- From heavy metals extraction industries, a chlor-alkali complex, titanium dioxide pigments, and magnesium and titanium 
metals manufactures. 
- From iron and steel, an auto-components foundry, a tool steels mini-mill, ferrous metal powders and powder metallurgy 
components producers. 
- From the chemicals and fertilisers industry, purified phosphoric acid, aluminium floride, hydrofluoric acid and fumed silica and 
sodium chlorate. 
- From forestry products, a saligna hardwood sawmill, a saligna products cluster, and high-quality charcoal production. 




The argument of this paper also begins to suggest a more appropriate role for national policy in 
regional development. An under-developed theme in this paper is the role of national-local 
relationships in shaping elements of regional institutional structure, in the case of Richards Bay 
through agencies such as the national departments, the national conglomerates operating locally, 
Portnet and the Industrial Development Corporation. The challenge for the SDI Office in the DTI is 
to convince these agencies to provide the correct incentives for changes in the relationships of key 
local organisations and actors. For example, this view is compatible with Lewis and Bloch’s 
suggestion that the DTI’s cluster initiatives and other programs aimed at competitiveness 
enhancement “develop a clearer regional focus; and that the SDIs need to design programmes 
with a considerably clearer focus on strengthening regional agglomerations and clusters” (1997; 
24). 
However, the argument of this paper also suggests limitations to the most ‘appropriate’ of 
national programs, since the dilemma is not simply to create new institutions, but rather to work 
with those that already exist. The institutional approach outlined here highlights the importance of 
actions by local agents that shift the decision-making premises of other actors in the regional 
economy (Amin, 1998). The difficulties of achieving this should not be under-estimated, but there is 
good news in this regard. It is clear that discussions leading to the formation of the SDI Trust have 
already prompted local actors to think critically about the development trajectory of the town; this 
start needs to be carefully nurtured and supported. 
The institutional approach to regional development also speaks directly to local planners. For 
example, local planning frameworks and processes have an important role in ensuring that cherry-
picked infrastructural and industrial investments are integral components of a wider and more 
inclusive development agenda. In other words, planners need to realise their potential for impacting 
on social power relations through the form and content of the planning institutions they structure 
(Bryson and Charby, 1996). 
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